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Abstract2
Right-wing populist governments in Central and South-eastern Europe are cur-
rently abusing the emergency caused by the pandemic in order to extend their 
power and influence over institutions through legislative changes. The govern-
ments in Poland, Serbia, Slovenia and Hungary have raised fears by their meas-
ures to either establish authoritarian regimes and/or to reassert their grip on 
power during the Covid19 crisis. This text is intended to give an insight into the 
measures of the ruling right-wing populist parties (PiS in Poland, SNS in Ser-
bia, SDS in Slovenia and Fidesz in Hungary) during the pandemic. On the one 
hand, the article intends to show that the individual governments have mis-
used the crisis to bring independent and/or state media under their control, 
to conclude corrupt deals between the ruling party and government-related 
companies and to put pressure on other independent institutions (such as the 
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judicial system) and the opposition. On the other hand, reactions by civil socie-
ty organizations and the European Union shall be examined. The article shows 
that both, civil society and EU pressure is indispensable, particularly in times 
of crisis, since shifts in power in favour of right-wing populist rulers happen 
swiftly and have negative long-term consequences for democracy.
Keywords: Covid 19, Democratization, Democratic Backsliding, European Un-
ion, Civil Society
Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, as well as the Refugee Crisis in 
2015 increased the electoral strength of right-wing political parties. Various 
scholars have noted a trend towards illiberal politics across the globe, 
whereat the Eastern and South-eastern European regions are no exception 
to this development (Kapidžić 2020, Bermeo 2016, Levitsky and Way 2010). 
While the rise of illiberal regimes takes on a variety of forms, depending on 
the context, one commonality is the formal respect of democratic proce-
dures (i.e. elections), but not to what comes before or after (Kriesi and 
Pappas 2015). In such settings, an uneven level playing field between the 
dominant ruling party and the political opposition is observed,but also 
less political freedom, captured state institutions and controlled media.
Democratic abuses are today thus less obvious and need a detailed anal-
ysis of the mechanisms that underpin an illiberal regime. 
Obviously, the current Covid19 pandemic presents a new challenge 
to regimes across the globe. Especially younger democracies, which are 
characterised by relatively less rigorous checks and balances’ mechanisms 
found themselves in a dare situation, in which the Covid19 Crisis could 
(and was) misused by illiberal ruling parties to fortify their rule. Right-wing 
populist governments in Central and South-eastern Europe are currently 
abusing the emergency caused by the pandemic in order to extend their 
power and influence over institutions through legislative changes. But not 
only are ruling parties misusing the crisis for their personal interests, the 
Covid19 pandemic has also revealed institutional weaknesses in younger 
democracies. The similarity between the measures undertaken by right-
wing governments in the wider Eastern European region is striking. This 
paper looks at the measures undertaken during the year 2020 in Hungary, 
Poland, Serbia and Slovenia.
While Hungary, Poland, Serbia and Slovenia have had different histor-
ical trajectories and differ according to their democracy indices, they 
converge on certain dimensions: in all four states, investigative journal-
ists, independent media and minority groups are attacked, whilst the inde-
pendence of state institutions (notably the judiciary) is either already 
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under the control of the ruling party or is currently experiencing pressure 
from the government. As an answer to these policies, in all four countries 
protests were organized but were often limited to online protests, protests 
from the balconies using kitchen utensils, or cycling protests. Last summer 
the European Union agreed to use EU funds to uphold the rule of law by 
using a conditionality clause for its member states. As things stand now, 
the conditionality clause needs to be reviewed by the European Court of 
Justice as requested by Hungary and Poland. This means that another two 
years will pass, before the clause is applicable.
This article introduces the reader first to the current political situa-
tion in Hungary, Poland, Serbia and Slovenia before discussing the meas-
ures undertaken from March 2020 until October 2020. As the pandemic is 
still ongoing in the beginning of 2021, the paper gives the reader a descrip-
tive overview of the policies conducted that concern the economy, state 
institutions and media. In addition, attacks on political opponents will 
also be presented. The final part discusses the reactions of civil society 
and the EU in times of the Covid19 crisis. As a matter of fact, right-wing 
leaders in Eastern Europe are very well connected, support each other and 
nurture close relationships. It is therefore of utmost importance to reveal 
how ruling parties try to strengthen their grip on power and why a strong 
answer by the European Union is absolutely necessary. 
Explanations for the rise in illiberal  
politics in eastern europe
While there is a plethora of classifications of regimes that are not fully 
democratic, but also not fully authoritarian, this article applies the concept 
of illiberal politics in order to grasp the procedural dimension of illiberal 
or hybrid regimes (Bieber 2020; Levitsky and Way 2010). Illiberal politics is 
therefore a set of policies “that extend an electoral advantage for governing 
parties with the aim to remain in power indefinitely. This includes perpet-
uating advantageous socio-economic structures and governing practices, 
as well as specific and targeted restrictive actions against political oppo-
nents and independent institutions” (Kapidžić 2020, 2). It results thus in 
hybrid and illiberal regimes, in which only formal democratic procedures 
are respected. 
The rise in illiberal politics in Eastern and South-eastern Europe since 
the GFC in 2008 resulted in numerous analyses on the subject. Given 
the development during the last decade in the two most dramatic cases– 
Hungary and Poland – a rich literature exists that deals with the phenom-
enon of illiberalism in these two countries (for example see Bernhard 2021; 
Bernhard 2020; Gora and Wilde 2020; Cianetti et al. 2018). The cases of 




than the direct breakdown of democracy into autocracy (for example via 
direct military interference), we are witnessing the establishment of hybrid 
regimes, where illiberal ruling practices are less blatant, more hidden and 
therefore, need more analytical scrutiny in order to detect them (Bermeo 
2016). The South-eastern European countries are no exception to this 
trend, whereat many of the post-Yugoslav successor states never moved 
away from their hybrid limbo since the end of the Yugoslav wars (Bieber 
2019). While Slovenia’s regime stability has been an anomaly within the 
former Yugoslav federation, recent electoral strength of the right-wing 
political party SDS as well as Janša’s nomination as Prime Minister in 2020 
has raised concerns for the country’s democratic future.
Scholars have emphasised various factors for the rise of illiberal regimes 
in Eastern and South-eastern Europe since 2008: the rise of populist parties 
and their ruling strategies (Vachudova 2020; Bieber et al. 2018; Innes 2014); 
the role of changing structural conditions, such as socioeconomic factors, 
domestic institutions and the characteristics of civil society (Bernhard 
2021; Bieber 2020; Greskovits 2020; Kapidžić 2020); as well as the EU’s 
responsibility for it (Sedelmeier 2014). This paper acknowledges the impor-
tance of external factors (primarily the role of the EU) as well as domestic 
factors (primarily the role of civil society organisations) when explaining 
the rise of illiberal politics.
As most of the CEE countries joined the EU in 2004, the disappearance 
of the stick and carrot relationship with the Union led to non-compliance 
with the EU’s fundamental norms, as countries are not subject anymore to 
enforcement mechanisms (Bernhard 2021, 19; Sedelmeier 2014). Authori-
tarian practices were not punished by the Union and with this, right-wing 
leaders were given the freedom to strengthen their grip on power (Kelemen 
2017).Thus, due to the absence of conditionality, the relationship changed 
between the EU member states. Furthermore, despite reaching a recent 
compromise regarding the rule of law clause, the European institutions 
demonstrated a weak and inconsistent response to the rising authoritarian 
practices in Poland and Hungary. Being not punished by the EU, leaders 
in the East continue to abuse their power. Reasons for not punishing illib-
eral behaviour are found in partisan politics as well as a weak normative 
consensus among the EU member states (Sedelmeier 2014).
In the Western Balkans, the conditionality mechanism is still in force, 
yet the expected positive influence on democratisation as in the CEE acces-
sion process failed to materialise (Schimmelfenning 2008; Schimmelfennig 
et. al 2006; Vachudova 2005).Consequently, scholars have recently started 
to emphasise the presence of unfavourable structural conditions in the 
Western Balkan countries and assessed the EU’s responsibility in a crit-
ical way (Elbasani 2013). One of the main criticisms refers to the accusa-
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tion of the EU being more interested in “stabilitocracy” than democracy 
(Bieber 2019; Kmezić 2019). The term denotes the current EU’s strategy 
towards the Western Balkans which focuses more on security conditions 
on the ground and interstate disputes, in order not to experience violent 
escalation in Europe’s backyard. As Veljković argues, the displacement of 
stability into the sphere of security pushed the question of democracy into 
the background, which led to captured states in the respective countries 
(Veljković, 2019: 80). 
Thus, the EU has been accused of possibly unintended negative effects 
in the region, as Börzel and Pamuk state. „Europeanisation can have unin-
tended negative effects on the domestic structure of the states. EU poli-
cies and institutions not only empower liberal reform coalitions to the 
extent that they exist in the first place, but can also bolster the power of 
incumbent authoritarian and corrupt elites“(Börzel and Pamuk 2012, 81). 
By supporting directly and indirectly authoritarian parties, EU institutions 
boost their publicity and increase their legitimacy. What is more, political 
leaders often misuse European conditionality and European demands in 
order to strengthen their own power base.Yet, not sanctioning such prac-
tices fortifies their strengthvis-à-vis liberal opposition parties, especially 
in a context where the ruling political party exerts pressure on the rule of 
law, the media and civil society organisations.
Next to the EU’s responsibility, numerous accounts point to the rele-
vance of non-autonomous civil society organisations in perpetuating 
illiberal regimes (Bernhard 2020; Greskovits 2020). Accordingly, it is not 
enough to understand why citizens voted in the first place for right-wing 
political parties, but also how right-wing parties are able to uphold power 
positions and to establish a lasting hegemony in the society (Greskovits 
2020). In this view, ruling parties have strong connections to civil society 
organisations which are not independent and function as a prolonged 
arm of the right-wing party (examples are the Civic Circles Movement in 
Hungary, Church affiliated organisations in Poland or GONGO in Serbia). 
Thus, internal characteristics of civil society organisations (i.e. whether it 
accepts liberal democracy and represents democratic values) and its links 
to the ruling power structure are quite important for the rise of illiberal 
politics (Bernhard 2020).
The article investigates the practices during the Covid19 crisis, whereat 
evidence is predominantly based on analysis of the newspaper articles in 
the last 12 months, investigative reports (Balkan Insight, BIRN) and official 
interviews with politicians and scholars. Currently, few scholarly studie s 
exist on illiberal measures in the four countries and time period assessed 
here (Fink-Hafner 2020). Thus, while external and domestic factors paved 




special attention is given to the ruling parties’ strategies in times of crisis, 
hence a doptinga procedural lens. The argument is therefore that despite 
different historical legacies of the four cases, very similar features and 
mechanisms are observed in the right-wing political parties.All came 
to power via elections and started to eliminate horizontal checks and 
balances, independent media, and thus, hollowing out democratic foun-
dations (Sadurski 2019; Scheppele 2014).3 The paper focuses on four areas 
in which the strategies of the right-wing political parties are described and 
compared: in (a) the economy, (b) rule of law, (c) media and (d) opposi-
tion. This aims to contribute to a better understanding of the concept of 
illiberal politics as a feature of illiberal regimes.
Before the pandemic:  
democratic backsliding in eastern europe
The rise of right-wing populist parties occurred before the Covid19 
pandemic and was, inter alia, enabled through the GFC in 2008/09. In 
Hungary, Viktor Orbán and the right-wing political party Fidesz is the 
dominant party since 2010. In Serbia, the SNS (Serbian Progressive Party) 
came to power in 2012, while in Poland PiS (Law and Justice Party) under 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski is ruling since 2015. In Slovenia, the right-wing SDS 
(Slovenian Democratic Party) had in the last elections in 2018 the best 
result as a single party. Its president, Janez Janša, is currently the Prime 
Minister in Slovenia.
The level of democracy, and generally, the independence of state insti-
tutions, differ in the four cases. However, there is convergence in some 
dimensions with regards to the quality of the regimes in recent years as 
well as the general trend, when looking at established democracy indices. 
Figure 1 depicts the V-Dem multiplicative polyarchy index. Since 2013 
Hungary, Poland and Serbia experience deterioration in their democracy 
level, while in Slovenia this deterioration happened more recently. Addi-
tionally, the newest report by Freedom House (Freedomhouse.org 2020) 
has classified Hungary as a hybrid regime (along Serbia), while Poland 
was classified as a semi-consolidated democracy (previously being classi-
fied as a consolidated democracy). This decision was largely determined 
by the increased influence of the ruling party in Hungary and Poland on 
the judicial system. Hungary is therefore the first EU member state which 
is classified as being a non-democratic regime. In addition, the October 
2020 report by the Commission on Serbia has stated that the country has 
3  Strictly speaking, Slovenia slightly differs from the other three cases as after the elections 
in 2018 Marjan Šarec Centre Party controlled a minority government. However, due to a poli-
tical stalemate, Šarec had to step down by the end of 2019 and Janez Janša became PM. 
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made no progress in the area rule of law, whilst elections held this summer 
were controlled by the ruling structures (European Commission 2020). 
Figure 1. V-Dem Multiplicative Polyarchy Index forHungary Poland,  
Serbia and Slovenia (2005–2019)
(Freedomhouse.org 2020) has classified Hungary as a hybrid regime (along Serbia), while 
Poland was classified as a semi-consolidated democracy (previously being classified as a 
consolidated democracy). This decision was largely determined by the increased influence of the 
ruling party in Hungary and Poland on the judicial system. Hungary is therefore the first EU 
member state which is classified as being a non-democratic regime. In addition, the October 
2020 report by the Commission on Serbia has stated that the country has made no progress in the 
area rule of law, whilst elections held this summer were controlled by the ruling structures 
(European Commission 2020).  
Figure 1.V-Dem Multiplicative Polyarchy Index forHungary Poland, Serbia and Slovenia (2005 
– 2019) 
Source: Varieties of Democracy Dataset Version 10. (available on www.v-dem.net) 
Note: The multiplicative polyarchy index asks the question: to what extent is the electoral process of democracy 
achieved? The index is operationalized as a chain, defined by its weakest link (multiplication). The components are 
the following: freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected executive and suffrage. In all 
four cases, the dimension freedom of expression deteriorated in the last years. 
As a result of these developments, the relationship with the European Union (EU) is strained, 
especially between the EU and Hungary, Poland and Serbia. In 2018, the European Parliament, 
with the support of the European People’s Party, has initiated a rule of law procedure under 
Source: Varieties of Democracy Dataset Version 10. (available on www.v-dem.net)
Note: The multiplicative polyarchy index asks the question: to what extent is the 
electoral process of democracy achieved? The index is operationalized as a chain, 
defined by its weakest link (multiplication). The components are the following: 
freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected executive 
and suffrage. In all four cases, the dimension freedom of expression deteriorated 
in the last years.
As a result of these developments, the relationship with the European 
Union (EU) is strained, especially between the EU and Hungary, Poland 
and Serbia. In 2018, the European Parliament, with the support of the 
European People’s Party, has initiated a rule of law procedure under Article 
7 against Hungary. As unanimity from all states is required, the proceed-
ings are stagnating (Mijnssen and Steinvorth 2020). Parallel, there are 
several proceedings against the PiS in Poland due to their controversial 
reform of its judiciary since 2017. Poland and Hungary protect each other 
from further measures. 
At the same time, a growing network and close relationships between 
the PiS, Fidesz, SDS in Slovenia and SNS in Serbia is taking place. In 




with the theme “the future of Europe”, in which the leaders presented 
their political vision for the European Union. During the conference, 
Orbán stated that keeping the EU together requires that the West “does 
not enforce its view on the Eastern countries”(Politico.com 2020, 1). The 
network between the right-wing parties is becoming ever more obvious as 
well as stronger. This is followed by growing economic ties as well as finan-
cial support to the respective right-wing party (Orbán’s support for Janša’s 
SDS as well as media outlets in Slovenia). 
Measures during the state of emergency
During the state of emergency, the parliament in Hungary has passed an 
emergency law on March 30th, which allowed Orbán to rule per decree. 
While also other European States have introduced the state of emergency, 
in Hungary the ruling Fidesz has used this situation to strengthen their 
grip on power. More than 200 decrees have been passed since March that 
not only serve to combat the pandemic but serve economic and polit-
ical purposes (Dw.com 2020b). According to Kreko, four approaches 
can be distinguished within these decrees: 1. the ruling party concluded 
new business contracts with oligarchs close to the government; 2. many 
decrees were directed towards the municipal finances, often strongholds 
of the opposition parties, thereby depriving them of important sources 
of income; 3. financial pressure was exerted on opposition politicians by 
high fines for allegedly disseminating „misinformation”; 4. human rights 
have been systematically curtailed, for example through the passage of the 
Omnibus Act in July 2020, which discriminates against the LGBT popu-
lation as it stipulates that the gender must be on the ID card at birth and 
cannot be changed (Youtube.com 2020).
Since the state of emergency was terminated relatively quickly, at the 
end of May, experts suspect that this instrument was deliberately used 
to demonstrate that there is no authoritarian style of government in 
Hungary (Youtube.com 2020). With the end of the state of emergency in 
May, however, a law was passed that allows the government to govern by 
decree and without control mechanisms during epidemics in the future 
(Dw.com 2020b). At the end of July, it was also announced that Index, one 
of the last long-standing and independent online magazines, would close 
because the editor-in-chief has been replaced by the new owners, whilst 
the advertising department was taken over by an oligarch close to Orbán. 
As a sign of protest, most employees have resigned. 
Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party has excellent links with right-wing conserv-
ative parties in Central and South-eastern Europe, including the PiS, 
which is ruling Poland since 2015. Imitating Fidesz, the PiS tried to bring 
the Supreme Court under its control by forcing an early retirement of its 
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judges. This move, however, was declared by the European Court of Justice 
to be incompatible with EU law. The Supreme Court is important in Poland 
as it confirms the validity of the election results in the country. There-
fore, the PiS had to wait for the end of the term of the Supreme Court’s 
president, which was the case during the Corona crisis. In May 2020, a 
new president of the court close to the government was sworn in (Dw.com 
2020a). In addition to its great influence on various state institutions, the 
PiS control the state television TVP, the only TV station that is broadcasted 
throughout the country.
In March, Poland’s government introduced a nationwide lockdown, 
which was welcomed by a large majority of the population. As in the other 
Eastern European countries, it quickly became clear that the country’s 
health system would not be able to cope with a large number of sick people, 
not least because of the severe migration of professionals and medical staff 
to Western Europe. After the almost three-month curfew, the Poles slowly 
returned to normality, also because presidential elections were to be held 
in June. In the midst of the pandemic, the two candidates, Duda from the 
PiS and his challenger Trzaskowski from the PO (Civic Platform) run a 
very close race. The focus was not necessarily on the management of the 
Corona crisis, but rather on the position of the candidates on government 
subsidies, cultural and ideological issues and human rights. There was as 
well a scandal before the elections. The Duda’s government had ordered 
100,000 protective masks from a „friend of the PiS”, which turned out to 
be useless (Notesfrompoland.com 2020).
The PiS candidate Duda has narrowly beaten his challenger. Contrary 
to the usual analyses of the Polish media, which portrays 51 percent of 
Poles as “conservative or nationalist”, it seems that the subsidies to fami-
lies (i.e. the Family 500+ program) which have been paid out since 2015 
were the decisive factor for PiS’ election success. The government supports 
families with 500 zlotys a month (around EUR 110), which makes a notice-
able contribution to the monthly budget in Poland. This lifted many fami-
lies out of poverty, especially those who live in smaller communities and 
villages. The nationalist-conservative bloc only makes up about a third of 
the electorate. In fact, it was Duda’s aggressive anti-LGBT rhetoric that 
led to a tight election result, and not because the majority of Poles have a 
right-wing conservative or semi-authoritarian view of the world. The anti-
LGBT campaign has thus rather harmed Duda, than helped him gaining 
votes. Against the background of an average annual economic growth of 
five percent, many voters decided in favour of the PiS, also out of fear that 





Elections were also held in Serbia this summer despite the Corona 
pandemic. The task force for the Covid19 crisis initially ridiculed the virus 
in March 2020 and asked residents to go shopping in Milan as there would 
be now clearance sale (Rs.n1info.com 2020a). After the first corona cases 
appeared, it quickly became clear that the underfunded and ailing health 
system in Serbia would be overwhelmed by a pandemic. The government 
then implemented some of the most draconian measures in Europe: 
day-long curfews from 6 p.m., an absolute curfew for the over 65-years-old 
population and a general curfew for everyone over the weekend, sometimes 
up to four consecutive days.
At the end of May, the SNS declared that the “war on the pandemic” 
has been won, in order to schedule the parliamentary elections for June 21 
(Rs.n1info.com 2020b). From absolute lockdown, the government quickly 
switched to opening discos and restaurants, allowing football games with 
up to 25,000 spectators, all without any epidemiological measures, but 
with the aim of giving voters a false sense of security so that they could vote 
on June 21. Consequently, the political opposition boycotted the elections, 
not only due to the pandemic, but also due to lack of free and fair condi-
tions for competition. As in 2016, there were cases of election fraud and 
manipulation, as well as a low turnout. As expected, President Vučić’s SNS 
celebrated a huge victory; Only 6 opposition MPs made into the parlia-
ment. 
However, the rapid relaxation of the corona protective measures and 
the holding of the elections turned out to be fatal after a few days. During 
the summer, the number of new infected persons was between 200 and 
300 per day, while local hospitals were in a near- catastrophic situation. 
There was not only a shortage of medical personnel, but also of basic mate-
rials such as masks and disinfectants. Many doctors and large parts of the 
medical staff became infected with the virus. Journalists who reported 
on the precarious conditions were arrested and later released under pres-
sure from civil society (Rs.n1info.com 2020). In addition, research by the 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) showed that the statistics 
in Serbia were manipulated and data on new infections and deaths were 
falsified so that the elections could be held in June (Birn.eu.com 2020).
In Slovenia, on the other hand, the right-wing conservative parties are 
not dominant, even if Janez Janša’s SDS won 25 percent of the votes in 2018 
and thus achieved the best election result single-handedly. After previous 
Prime Minister Marjan Šarec resigned with his center-left minority govern-
ment, Janša was sworn in as Prime Minister in January 2020. This gave 
him control over the measures during the Corona crisis. As in the coun-
tries previously discussed, the government tried to replace the board of the 
state television RTS during this period. During this process, however, the 
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Constitutional Court stopped Janša on the grounds that a change of staff 
before the expiry of the board’s term of office would be unconstitutional. 
At the same time, independent media and journalists who reported on 
the measures imposed by the government in a critical way were attacked. 
A corruption scandal was also revealed. When buying masks and venti-
lators, the government had given preference to a company that is close to 
the ruling party (Fink-Hafner 2020). The material procured had proven to 
be insufficient. Moreover, many firms who won public tenders were not 
experts in the field, nor did they provide any expertise in the health care 
sector. In this way, one of Slovenia’s richest businessman secured a 24.5 
million EUR deal to provide protective equipment. Although Slovenia has 
a lengthy and controlled bidding process, these rules have been suspended 
due to the pandemic (Delić and Zwitter 2020). In addition, another scandal 
was revealed in the second wave, when the government purchased useless 
Covid19 tests, which were delivered through connections with the youth 
organisations of Janša’s party (Balkaninsight.com 2021). As in previous 
governments where Janša held decision-making positions, he replaced 
the heads of the military and police and the head of the National Public 
Health Institute. Hence, Slovenia is also experiencing increased attacks by 
the right-wing SDS on state institutions, media and journalists.
Even if the takeover of state television in Slovenia has been stopped, 
Janša learns from other right-wing populist leaders, uses Twitter every day 
and tries to set up his own media houses and television stations with finan-
cial help from Orbán’s circles. On July 9th, a law was passed that provides 
a budget reduction of 13 million EUR for the state television RTS, which 
would lead to a reduction of around 600 jobs (Birn.eu.com 2021). It is clear 
that Janša was looking in the direction of Budapest, Warsaw and Belgrade: 
Fidesz, the PiS and the SNS have long ago taken control of the state tele-
vision. The controversial law is currently being debated in the Slovenian 
parliament, while the Culture Ministry received numerous objections from 
more than 100 organisations and individuals about the proposed legisla-
tion. 
Reactions from citizens and  
the european union
The corona crisis was misused by right-wing populist leaders to negotiate 
corrupt deals between government-affiliated companies and the ruling 
party, as well to control various media outlets and to increase their influ-
ence on institutions. Civil society responded with protests and demonstra-
tions, which were heavily supported by left-wing movements and NGOs. 
The ways how citizens demonstrated ranged from car demonstrations in 




with kitchen utensils in Belgrade. After the lockdown, mass protests were 
organised in Serbia in order to prevent new lockdowns. In Poland, the 
parliamentary debate on further tightening of the abortion law has led to 
demonstrations by the end of October. Such protests need to be analysed 
as a reaction to the restrictive and corrupt measures undertaken by the 
right-wing governments, and not primarily against epidemiological meas-
ures that should protect the health of its citizens. While the Friday protests 
in Ljubljana are still ongoing at the beginning of 2021 (albeit on a smaller 
scale), protests in the other capital cities have gradually faded away. 
Simultaneously, a response to the current developments by external 
actors is weak and disappointing. The European Parliament has debated 
for several years how to react to breaches against the rule of law within the 
EU (Gora and Wilde 2020). As applying Article 7 on the member states 
led to a faltering process in the past, several EU representatives called 
for making the accession to the EU funds conditional on a rule of law 
clause. As expected, during the budget negotiation of the Coronavirus 
recovery fund, Poland and Hungary demonstrated their political coali-
tion, vetoing any adoption of the budget (Holesch and Kyriazi 2021). This 
resulted in a political stalemate for months. By the end of 2020, a compro-
mise between Poland, Hungary and the EU was reached. The compromise 
between the rule of law and access to EU funds drawn-up by Germany 
has been heavily criticised by several MEPs (Theguardian.com 2020). As 
Hungary and Poland are currently insisting on legal review of the clause 
by the European Court of Justice, its implementation can be postponed 
up to two years. 
Those who oppose the compromise, notably the Northern EU coun-
tries, state that the new text is narrowing down the definition of rule of law, 
rowing back on important elements. Furthermore, the compromise aims to 
punish breaches against the rule of law which are linked to the EU budget.
Critics thus state that the clause is somehow degraded to an anti-corrup-
tion measure. Additionally, Poland and Hungary succeeded in demanding 
a need for a qualified majority: 15 of the member states, representing at 
least 65 % of the EU’s population are needed to support possible sanctions. 
The European Commission holds the monopoly on the right of the initia-
tive, but as the Commission was rather reluctant in condemning illiberal 
practices in Hungary and Poland, only time will show whether something 
will change through the rule of law clause. 
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Concluding discussion
The article demonstrated similarities between the strategies of ruling right-
wing parties in the Eastern Europe. All current leaders came to power via 
formal democratic procedures, i.e. elections, while all of them are as well 
experienced politicians and had a “start-up” period during the 1990s. The 
democratic abuses are, therefore, less blatant and more hidden, andthe 
mechanisms used by the ruling parties need more analytical scrutiny in 
order to make sense of illiberal politics, and therefore, a rise in illiberal 
regimes in Eastern Europe. While the article demonstrated a convergence 
of illiberal politics during the Covid19 crisis, the outcome in the four cases 
is likely to differ. Notably, the country that exhibits the strongest, most 
independent institutions, as well as most autonomous and strong civil 
society organizations, will experience the least democratic backsliding. 
This is currently the case in Slovenia. As things stand now, Janša’s SDS is 
facing a strong opposition, as the current political crisis in the country 
shows. In February 2021, the Slovenian parliament aimed to topple the 
right-wing government in fear of democratic backsliding. Yet, Janša 
survived the no-confidence vote. Next elections are set to be held in early 
2022, until then the SDS still has time to continue with its illiberal politics.
The ruling right-wing parties apply similar strategies in order to 
strengthen their grip on power and to weaken any domestic opposition. 
Measures range from corrupt contracts, control of courts and independent 
media to defaming and threatening the political opposition. Their mech-
anisms nurture clientelism and nepotism, ultimately leading to demo-
cratic backsliding. While the EU compromise on the rule of law clause 
has been interpreted by some as disappointing, not counting anymore 
on Brussel’s help, certain domestic factors still can exert pressure on the 
right-wing parties. In the case of Slovenia, independent institutions still 
can check Janša’s government. While Janša aimed to strengthen Slove-
nia’s military complex with an investment of 780 million Euros for the 
purchase of weapons (like Hungary), the Constitutional Court has tempo-
rary suspended the implementation of the law. As major institutions in 
the other cases are already under control of the ruling party, and there-
fore independent civil society organizations, coupled with a strong answer 
from the EU, are indispensable. The current situation in Europe and the 
ongoing pandemic during the winter months present substantial chal-
lenges for the future of democracy in Eastern Europe as well as the future 
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